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(2) That Section 8 of the Court of Claims Act-has transformed
an unenforceable obligation into an actionable right and applies :the
rule of respondeat superior to the state.
(3) That insofar as some courts have been lax in extending Section 8 to include p6litical subdivisions of the state, as was obviously
intended by its general language, the statute be amended to bring
these local bodies within its purview.
It is only by express legislative enactment that we can hope to
align the mass of confusing decisions on the subject of charitable,
state and municipal hospital liability.
HARRY LORBER.

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 29 OF THE
NEW YORK WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT

Introduction
When the New York Workmen's Compensation Law first became effective,' the remedy of the employee injured in the course of
certain specified employments 2 was exclusively in compensation, unless the injury resulted proximately from the tortious act of a third
person,3 " or unless the employer failed to' provide compensation insurance as required by the law. 4 Where the employee was injured
by the negligence or wrong of a third person, Section 29 provided
that he could claim compensation or pursue his common law remedy
against the tort feasor. 5

He could not do both, except to the extent

I The Workmen's Compensation Law was enacted by N. Y. Laws 1913,
c. 816 (eff. Dec. 16, 1913) as Chapter 67 of the Consolidated Laws. Constitutional authorization to enact this law (N. Y. CNsT. Art. I, § 19) was not given
to the legislature until Jan. 1, 1914. To assure the constitutionality of the
statute the legislature reenacted it by N. Y. Laws 1914, c. 41. A previous
attempt to enact a workmen's compensation law was made by the legislature by
N. Y. Laws 1910, c. 647, but it was declared unconstitutional in Ives v. South
Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911).
2 The law covers certain hazardous employments, and all employments,
with certain exceptions, in which four or more operatives are engaged. N. Y.
WORK. Comrn. LAW § 3.
3 Prior to N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 695, a co-employee was a "third person";
Judson v. Fielding, 227 App. Div. 430, 237 N. Y. Supp. 348 (3d Dept. 1929);
Shelter
v. Grobsmith, 143 Misc. 380, 257 N. Y. Supp. 353 (1932).
4
N. Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 11; N. Y. WORK. ComP. LAW § 52 (the
employer's failure to comply with the Act is a misdemeanor).
Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N. Y. 273, 146 N. E.
377 (1925); Schubert v. Finkelstein, 244 N. Y. 483, 155 N. E. 906 (1927);
Miller v. New York Rys., 171 App. Div. 316, 157 N. Y. Supp. 200 (2d Dept.
1916) ; Roecklein v. American Sugar Refining Co., 222 App. Div. 540, 226 N. Y.
Supp. 375 (2d Dept. 1928) ; Sabatino v. Crimmins, 102 Misc. 172, 168 N. Y.
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that if he filed due notice of his election to sue the third person, he
could thereafter claim compensation for any deficiency between what
he had actually recovered in his action and what he could have recovered had he elected to take compensation." If the employee claimed
compensation he was required to assign his cause of action against
the third person to the person liable to pay the compensation.7 The
assignment carried with it the right to recover all the damages which
the employee might have had if he had sued.8 This meant that the
insurance carrier 9 might recover a greater amount than the award
of compensation. What, then, of the surplus, if any, above the
amount of compensation for which the carrier was liable? Could the
carrier retain the entire fund, or was the amount above the compensation charged with a trust in favor of the injured employee? It is
this aspect of Section 29 10 that will be dealt with here, together with
Supp. 495 (1918); Louis Bossert & Sons v. Piel Bros., 112 Misc. 117, 182 N. Y.

Supp. 620 (1920)
6 O'Brien v. Lodi, 246 N. Y. 46, 157 N. E. 925 (1927).
7Sabatino v. Crimmins, 102 Misc. 172, 168 N. Y. Supp. 495 (1918);
Godfrey v. Brooklyn Edison Co., 115 Misc. 21, 187 N. Y. Supp. 263 (1921).
8 Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N. Y. 273, 146 N. E.
377 (1925); Lang v. Brooklyn City R. Co., 217 App. Div. 501, 217 N. Y. Supp.
277 (1st Dept. 1926).
9 "Insurance carrier" or "carrier" as used in this note includes employers
who are self insurers, the state insurance fund, and private insurance companies. In short, these terms refer to the person who is liable for the payment
of compensation. There is an important distinction between an assignment to
the "employer" and an assignment to the person liable for the payment of compensation when such person is not the employer. Under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act the assignment is to the
.employer and if he sues and recovers a judgment it belongs to him in its
entirety. The employer's insurance carrier cannot sue in his own name without
joining the employer, and in such case the carrier may only indemnify himself,
and the excess, if any, belongs to the employer. Globe Indemnity Co. v.
Atlantic Lighterage Corp., 271 N. Y. 234, 2 N. E. (2d) 640 (1935).
10 N. Y. WoRIC. Comp. LAW § 29 provides: "1. If an employee entitled to
compensation under this chapter be injured or killed by the negligence or wrong
of another not in the same employ, such injured employee, or in case of death,
his dependents, need not elect whether to take compensation under this chapter
or to pursue his remedy against such other but may take such compensation and
at any time either prior thereto or within six months after the awarding of
compensation, pursue his remedy against such'other subject to the provisions of
this section. If such injured employee, or in case of death, his dependents, take
or intend to take compensation under this chapter and desire to bring action
against such other, such action must be commenced not later than six months
after the awarding of compensation and in any event before the expiration of
one year from the date such action accrues. In such case, the state insurance
fund, if compensation be payable therefrom, and otherwise the person, association, corporation or insurance carrier liable for the payment of such compensation, as the case may be, shall have'a lien on the proceeds of any recovery from
such other, whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise, after the deduction
of the reasonable and necessary expenditures, including attorney's fees, incurred
in effecting such recovery, to the extent of the total amount of compensation
awarded under or provided or estimated by this chapter for such case and the
expenses for -medical treatment paid by it and to such extent such recovery
shall be deemed for the benefit of such fund, person, association, corporation or
carrier. Notice of the commencement of such action shall be given within
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the changes in Section 29 regulating assignments of claims against
third persons to the insurance carriers, and the problems which have
arisen, or may arise from the various amendments to the section.
Particular attention will be direted to the 1935 amendment which
gave the employee the right to two-thirds of any excess recovery
where the carrier sued the third person, and to the important change
of 1937 which allows the employee to claim compensation and also
to sue the third person responsible for his injury.
Legislative Development of Section 29
In its original form, Section 2911 provided that if an injured
employee elected to take compensation, he had to file a notice of his
election and execute an assignment of his cause of action, if any,
against the third person who caused.the injury. Once a binding election was made it was irrevocable. 2 If the employee chose to sue the
third person he was free to do so as the statute did not alter his common law rights,. but on the contrary, it gave him new and additional
rights.'3 The statute did not require the employee to file any notice
of election to sue the third person, but if he failed to do so, he could
not thereafter claim a deficiency in compensation in the event that
his recovery was less than he could have had in compensation.1 4
After bringing an action against the third person the employee lost
thirty days thereafter to the commissioner, the employer and the insurance
carrier upon a form prescribed by the commissioner.
"2. If such injured employee, or in case of death, his dependents, has
taken compensation under this chapter but his failed to commence action
against such other within the time limited therefor by subdivision one, such
failure shall operate as an assignment of the cause of action against such other
to the state for the benefit of the state insurance fund, if compensation be
payable therefrom, and otherwise to the person, association, corporation, or
insurance carrier liable for the payment of such compensation. If such fund,
person, association, corporation or carrier, as such an assignee, recover from
such other, either by judgment, settlement or otherwise, a sum in excess of the
total amount of compensation awarded to such injured employee or his dependents and the expenses .for medical treatment paid by it, together with the
reasonable and necessary expenditures incurred in effecting such recovery, it
shall forthwith pay to such injured employee or his dependents, as the case may
be, two-thirds of such excess, and to the extent of two-thirds of any such
excess such recovery shall be deemed for the benefit of such employee or his
dependents. * * *
"6. The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall be the
exclusive remedy to an employee, or in case of death his dependents, when such
employee is injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another in the
same employ."
"2 See note 6, supra.
12 See note 7, supra; Schubert v. Finkelstein, 244 N. Y. 583, 155 N. E.
906 (1927); Breital v. Hinderstein, 236 App. Div. 203, 258 N. Y. Supp. 237
(3d Dept. 1932).
13 Lester v. Otis Elevator Co., 169 App. Div. 613, 155 N. Y. Supp. 524
(1st Dept. 1915).
14 Ibid.
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his right to claim a deficiency in compensation if' he discontinued or
compromised the. suit without the carrier's consent. 15 "
•. An amendment in 1916 '6 .added a directory povision relative to
the method.of election to be followed where the employee was killed
and.left minor dependents surviving.
: In 19.17 important changes -were.made. Whereas formerly-the
employee had to ftle- an assignment. of his cause .of. action against a
third person with his. claim for comlpensation, by this amendment the
assignment was made to operate automatically at the time an award
was made. Thus, the assignment became effective by operation of
law 1xupon the 'maifig of an awaid,1 and not at the time of electing
compensation. 9 Another important change was made.by the ,1924
amendment,2 6 but it'does not concern the pisent discussion., I Fur-,
fhermore" an amendment in 1934 took from the injured' employee r.
his 'surviving dependenis the right2 to si co-eniployees for negligence
"
,,.
or wrong producing tliinj'ries.
In 1935, a' very impoitant amendment was enacted, 23 , It pro-,

vided, that ivhere the employee's. cause ,6f action had. Veen assigned
t6 'the carrier, the enm Ioyee was; to-,be paid two-thirds "of any re-,
coveryn excess of ,the sum. riecessary to. indemnify.the "carrier. -The
fact, that thelemployee is alI6we1'onlY two-thirds of any excess, and
the further fact that prior to this amendmeit fie received no part of,
it, indicates that.the legislature tqok an arbitrary stand in azi.Rttept
to comprofiie a ituatior which s'irored of unjust en
tq com ieenrichm'enton
one,
hand,, and, an increase of.insurance. rates, on.the other.
The last material amendment t6,Section, 20 Nwai enacted in"
J93 ,P
"

O'Brien v., Lodi, 246:-N. Y. 46, 157 :N.-E 925 (1927_

'.
. .
Y. Laws 1916, c.',622- §'29. ,
•"
"Sabatino y. Crimmins, .102 'Misc. 172,. 168, N,. Y, Supp.,,495" (1918)';
Godfreyv. Brooklyn 'Edison. Co,, 115. Mis=,t21, 187..N., Y.-.Supp- 263 (1921)-;
Luna v,. Andrews, 152 Misc. -568,-274 'N: Y. Supp. 432.'(1934).; Bellangr. v.Economy Engineering Co,--156.Misc-. 688, 282 .Nr'Y.: Supp. 325-(1935) ..
..
• isThe awarding of compensation'did-not. bring ,about an-assignment, where
the employee. had not, claimed compensation and 'refused 'to.accept payment of
the award from :the-.insurance" carrier. 'Dyer., v.:"Central. Savings Bank, 137
Misc.- 509, 242 X, Y. 'Supp. 74 ('1930)
.'.
.
,"
•
.
.19 N. Y. Laws. 1917,'ec. 705, § 29. "
.'. '
.20 N. Y. Laws 1924, 'c. 499, § 29.
..
-.21.N Y. WORK.Comp. LAw § 15, 'subds. 8.and 9 provide that the insurance
carrier must pay $500 into each of two -rehabilitation funds where, an employee
is killed and there are no survivors entitled to compensation. The '1924 amend-,
ment of Section 29 gave the insurance carrier."a cause of action for the amount
of such payment together with the reasonable funeral. expenses 'and the expense
of medical-treatment which- shall be in atddition to: any cause of 'action by the
legal representative of the deceased." See Phoenix Indemnity Co. v -Staten
Island Rapid Transit Co., 224 App. Div. 346, 230 N. Y. Supp. 747 (2d Dept
1928);
2 2 (1929) 42 HARv. L. REv. 447; (1930) .5 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 133.
N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 695; Judson v. Fielding, 227 App. Div. 430, 237
N. Y. Supp. 348 (3d Dept. 1929); Shelter v. Grobsmith, 143. Misc. 380, 257
N. Y. Supp. 353 (1932),; Mittman v. Meyerson, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 575 (1940):
.23 N. Y. -Laws 1938, c. 328, § 29:
•
24 N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 87, § 29. A later amendment, N.' Y. Laws-1937;
c. 684, merely numbered the divisions of the section.
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By it, the employee may claim compensation and also, provided he
brings his action within six months of the making of an award, sue
'the third person. If he follows this course, the insurance carrier is
given a lien on the recovery, after the deduction of the reasonable
and necessary expenses, including attorney's fees, for the compensation paid, or in case compensation is to be paid periodically, for an
amount to be determined by the industrial board based upon the
survivorship- annuitants table of mortality, the remarriage tables of
the Dutch Royals Insurance Institution and such facts as the board
may deem pertinent.2 .If the employee does. not sue within six
months, the carrier becomes the assignee of the cause of action, but
if successful he must pay to the employee two-thirds of the excess in
the manner provided by the 1935 amendment. Like the change in

the method of assignment brought'about by the 1917 amendment,, the
section as it now stands makes -the employee's cause of action, pass
to the carrier by operation of law if the employee does not bring
suit within six months.
-

Effects of the 1935 and 1937 Ameindments

The title of Section 29 has .lway*s contained the word "subrogation", but the text of the section prior to 1935 provided for an
assignment of the employee's cause of action to the carrier without

specifying whether subrogation in its primary sefise, i.e., indemnification, was intended, or whether the carrier was to be "substituted"
for the employee, 26 not only in the action against the third person,
but also in the right to retain betieficially the entire recoVery.27
N. Y. WoRx. ComP. LAw § 29, subd. 2.
26 Referring to a similar provision of the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Law, the Supreme Court of that state held that the insurance-carrier's
rights did not rest upon the principle of subrogation. U. S. Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 161 Va. 373, 170 S. E. 728 (1933).
27 No New York court has written an opinion in a case where it was
necessary to decide if the carrier became the owner of the entire amount recovered from a third person. In Casualty Company of America v. A. L. Swett
Electric Light and Power Co., 174 App. Div. 825, 162, N. Y. Supp. 107 (4th
Dept. 1916), the court had before it an action by an insurance carrier against a
third person whose negligence was alleged to have caused the employee's death.
After holding that the carrier's recovery was not limited to indemnification, the
court stated that the judgment might be regarded as impressed with a trust to
reimburse the carrier and to pay the surplus to the employee's legal representatives. Substantially the same question was involved in U. S. Fidelity v.
N. Y. Ry., 93 Misc. 118, 156 N. Y. Supp. 615 (App. T. 1916), but the court
held that the recovery of the carrier was to be limited to indemnification, as a
narrow interpretation should be placed upon "subrogation" because the statute
was in derogation of the common law rule that causes of action for personal
injuries are non-assignable. The assignment of the cause of action by the
person entitled to compensation to the carrier was held to make it the latter's
property in Traveler's Ius. Co. v. Padula,224 N. Y. 397, 121 N. E. 348 (1918).
But despite this holding, in Bossert v. Piel Bros., 112 Misc. 117, 119, 182 N. Y.
Supp. 620, 622 (1920) the court said, in reliance upon the Swett case, supra:
25
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Until the 1935 amendment, an employee who was injured by a
third person and who elected to take compensation was limited to
the award, although the person liable to pay it might, by virtue of
the assignment to him of the employee's cause of action against such
third person, recover a larger sum. The person liable to pay compensation was subrogated to the employee's cause of action to the
extent that he became the absolute owner of the entire recovery, and
not merely entitled to indemnify himself for the amount of the award. 2 8
The 1935 amendment effected a change in the substantive rights of
the employee and the insurance carrier by giving to the former a
right to two-thirds of any excess recovered by the carrier. 29 No
"Paying the compensation the employer may then -sue the wrongdoer, and all
that is recovered above the amount paid as compensation is for the benefit of
the injured employee." Royal Indemnity Co. v. J. G. White, 120 Misc. 332,
198 N. Y. Supp. 264 (1923) held that the carrier could recover in the stead of
the employee, but indicated that the carrier was not entitled to a surplus
remaining above the amount necessary to indemnify him. The next decision
referring to this question took the view that the assignment to the carrier
vested in him a beneficial interest in the entire recovery. Matter of Zirpola v.
Casselman, Inc., 237 N. Y. 367, 143 N. E. 222 (1924). Finally, just before the
1935 amendment of Section 29, the question came squarely before the court in
Tracy v. American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., 266 N. Y. 536, 195 N. E. 188
(1935), wherein the court decided that the assignment was absolute and vested
the beneficial interest in the entire recovery in the insurance carrier.
28 This statement applies to all cases in which the employee is alive and to
cases where all. those who are entitled to share in his estate are dependents.
But if some of the distributees are not dependents entitled to compensation, the
insurance carrier has a right only to the portion which the dependents would
take as distributees. As the cause of action may not be split, the deceased
employee's administrator, and not the insurance, carrier, must bring the action.
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Graham & Norton Co., 254 N. Y. 50, 171 N. E.
903 (1930). That the cause of action may not be split, see Lang v. Brooklyn
City Ry. Co., 217 App. Div. 501, 217 N. Y. Supp. 277 (lst Dept. 1926).
29 N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 328, § 29 ("Subrogation to remedies of employees.
If an employee entitled to compensation under this chapter be injured or killed
by the negligence or wrong of another not in the same employ, such injured
employee, or in case of death, his dependents, shall, before any suit or any
award under this chapter, elect whether to take compensation under this chapter
or to pursue his remedy against such other. Such election shall be evidenced
in such manner as the commissioner may by regulation prescribe. If such
injured employee, or in case of death his dependents, elect to take compensation
under this chapter, the awarding of compensation shall operate as an assignment
of the cause of action against such other to the state for the benefit of the state
insurance fund, if compensation be payable therefrom, and otherwise to the
person, association, corporation', or insurance carrier liable for the payment of
such compensation. If such fund, person, association, corporation or carrier,
as such an assignee, recover from such other, either by judgment, settlement or
otherwise, a sum in excess of the total amount of compensation awarded to
such injured employee or his dependents and the expenses for medical treatment
paid by it, together with the reasonable and necessary expenditures incurred in
effecting such recovery, it shall forthwith pay to such injured employee or his
dependents, as the case may be, two-thirds of such excess, and to the extent of
two-thirds of any such excess such recovery shall be deemed for the benefit of
such employee or his dependents. * * *
"The right to compensation or benefits under this chapter, shall be the
exclusive remedy to an employee, or in case of death his dependents, when such
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procedural change was wrought by this amendment.
An amendment in 1937 materially changed the procedure, and,
although a contrary view has been expressed by the Court of Appeals,
it seems also to have made a substantive change.3" The amendment
gives the employee the right to take compensation and thereafter
to sue the third person responsible for his injury, provided he brings
his action within six months after receiving an award,31 and provided
further that the action is brought within one year from the date of
the injury.82 Under this last amendment the insurance carrier has
a lien upon the employee's recovery for the amount of compensation
paid, or which he may be required to pay, if compensation be payable
periodically. In"the latter event, as the extent of the carrier's liability
is not immediately determinable, it is to be estimated by the industrial
employee is injured or killed by the negligence or wrong of another in the
same employ. § 2. This act shall take effect immediately.").
3o In Hession v. Sari Corp., 283 N. Y. 262, 28 N. E. (2d) 712 (1940),
rev'g, 258 App. Div. 969, 16 N. Y. S. (2d) 951 (2d Dept. 1940), N. Y. Laws
1935, c. 328, § 29, was in effect when plaintiff was injured. He elected compensation, but brought suit, after the 1937 amendment (N. Y. Laws 1937, c.
684, § 29, eff. Sept. 1, 1937) was enacted, against defendant, a third person who
allegedly caused his injuries. In holding that the employee might maintain the
action the court said: "In short, the 1937 amendment of section 29 affected
only matters of judicial procedure and consequently was applicable to the
plaintiff's alleged previously existing cause of action." Actually, the 1937
amendment does bring about a change in substantive rights. To illustrate:
Assume the award to be $1,000 and the recovery from the third person to be
$2,000. Under the 1935 amendment, if the employee sued he would recover
$2,000, but he could not also claim compensation. If he elected compensation
he would receive an award of $1,000, and two-thirds of the surplus recovered
by the insurance carrier, a total of $1,666.66. As the statute now stands, the
employee may take the award of $1,000, and, provided he brings suit within
six months thereafter, sue the third person, recovering $2,000 on which the
carrier has a lien for $1,000 for the compensation paid. Here the employee
receives a total of $2,000. If the employee takes an award of $1,000 and fails
to bring suit against the third party within six months thereafter, the carrier
may sue and recover $2,000 of which he retains $1,000 for compensation paid,
and one-third of the balance, paying the employee two-thirds or $666.66. Here
the total received by the employee in compensation and damages is $1,666.66.
Apparently there is no substantive change because under both statutes the
employee receives $2,000 when he is the plaintiff in the action against the
third person, and only $1,666.66 when the carrier is the plaintiff. In reality
there is a substantive change, because under the 1935 amendment the carrier
obtained a vested right to one-third of any surplus above the amount of the
award, and the employee, by accepting the award, precluded himself from
suing the third person. Now the carrier does not receive a vested right to
one-third of any surplus upon the making of the award, as he formerly did,
but only if the employee fails to sue the third person within six months after
an award has been made. If the court meant to hold in Hession v. Sari, supra,
that the 1937 amendment destroyed the right to one-third of any surplus which
vested in the insurance carrier when an award was made to Hession, it would
seem that the section violates the 14th Amendment of the U. S. Constitution.
31 N. Y. WORK. ComP. LAW § 29, subd. 1.
32 Ibid. The one-year period of limitation is for the benefit of the insurance carrier and may not be used as a defense by the third person. McCue v.
J. F. Shea Co., 24 N. Y. S. (2d) 307 (1940).
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board "upon the'basis of th: surivoiship -annuitants table of mortality, th6 remarriage tables of the Dutch-Royal Insurance Institution
and such facts as, it may deem -pertinent".3 •
" The 1935 ,amendment gave the employee a right to two-thirds of
the. excess 'recovered by.the insurer,, but it carried with it no assurance that there would be.an) such excess even though the employee's
actual damages were far greater than the award. -The statute did not
compel the carrier-to sue, as the legislature evidantly thought the car,rier's desire to be indemnified and to -share in.one-third of the excess
recovery-would afford sufficient incentive. Primarily the carrier would
be interested ,in indemnity. The employee had, no control over the
conduct bf. the action, and. the possibility certainly, was present that
in-any doubtfuL case the carrier would prefer to -compromise for an
amount equa to the award, rather than to risk an adverse verdict
4r an attempt to. secure full damages. Then too, in many cases the
carrier might have been the insurer of the tort feasor as well as that
.of the employer.. In such. cases it is very doubtful that the insurer
Wotold bring sifit against itself, aiid it is just as doubfful'that it would
"co inpromise" the claitn in a mannerwhj'ch would'provide a surplus
I
. '
"
for. the "employee.
-

I 'The present procedure is apparently much fairer and better de-

signed to saddle 'the loss on the wrongdoer.' The employee, unlike
the 'carrier, is priimarily interested' in a recovery wiich will provide
-something in excess of the amount of the award.': It is to his advantage, therefore, to prosecute the action with all his energy, for he
has everything to gain and nothing tolose. -Practically, of course,
in. Maiy 'cases he will 'not be in -such 'a favorable position to sue as the
carrier 'because, of hig limited resources, but the, carrier's interest in
-the outcome would undoubtedly result in.'its...offering the employee
every assistance.
.The.'ature of thie carrier's lien was dis'cus'sed 'by the trial court
-in Butcher's Muudl Casualty .Co..v. Emerald Cab. Corp. 4 In that
case an employee of the plaintiff's assured was .injured by a taxicab
owned by the defendant on December 28, 1937-after the 1937 amendfnfent. The employee brought suit and thereafter: settled her claim
against 'he defendant. Prior to that time. the plaintiff insurance carrier advanced $30.00 -for -medical expenses which the employer is
-bound 'to provide under Workmen's Comfipensation Law, Section 13,
This section gives the employer "an additional cause
subdivision c.
f

33

-N..Y. WORM Comr'. LAW § 29, subd. 2.
34 169 Misc. 749, 8 N, Y..S. (2d) 746 (1939).

,'5N. Y. WORK. Co'up. LAW § 13, subd. c ("The liability of- a 'employer
for medical treatment as Herein provided shall not be affected by'the fact that
his employee was injured through the fault or negligence of a third party, not
in the same employ, unless and until notice 'of election to sue or the, bringing
of suit against such third party. The employer shall, hbweveri have an additional cause of action against such third party to recover any affioults paid by
him for such medical treatment, in like manner as provided irsection twentyr
nine of this chapter.").
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of action against such third party to recover any amounts paid by him
for such medical treatment, in like manner as provided in section
twenty-nine of this chapter." The, plaintiff sued under this section,
but the court held that the "additional cause of action" given by Section 13,. subdivision c, had been converted into a lien, by the 1937
amendment of Section 29, when the employee brings the action, and,
that as timely notice was not given to the defendant the lien had been
lost. 'The decision was reversed by the Appellate Term, 6 on the
ground that the amendment of Section 29 had no effect upon- the
cause of action given to the employer under Section. 13, subdivision
c,3 7 but. the' suggestion remains that the lien provided for in Section
29 does not attach and become binding upon the 'defendant by operation of law, but only .by giving him seasonable notice of it. Probablythis represents a proper. interpretation of the :provision, because a
contrary holding would iequire the defendant to pay the. employee's
judgment at-his peril, even. though, he: was not aware of, the fact that.
the employee had received an award.'--,
Particular-.Problerms
-In its present, form the section appears 4t 'bring about greater
equity than resulted under -it prior to 19.35.. This is its general design, at least, and it manifests a desire on .the part of the 'legislature.
to extend still further the paternalistic concept which underlies the
Act. So many problems are presented by technical "loose ends", however, that it may well be that more often than not the result attained
in practice will fall far short of the desideratum. The following are
a few of the points, vhich appear .to .the writer to contain the 'seeds
of litigation.;

Subdivision I of Section 29 provides that if the employee takes
compensation and sues,,the third. party tort feasor "such- action must
be commenced not later'than, six months after the awarding of compensation and in-any event before the expiration of one year from the
date such action accrues." * if the employee fails to comnimence.such
action within the time limited, subdivision 2 of Section '29 provides
that the failure shall operate to -assign' the cause of action to the
carrier. The statute provides for no other event which will bring
about the assignment, Wliat,,will be the position of the'carrier if the
employee brings suit just before 'the period of limitation terminiates,
but goes no further? The~statute does not providethat the employee
86 174 Misc. 1, 19 N. Y. S. (2d) 685 (1940).

37 See City of New York v.-Steers & Menke, 167 Misc. 566, 4 N. Y. ,S. (2d)
292 (1937) (where the city recovered as the employee's assignee and also in
its own right 'under' N. Y. WORK. Camp, LAW § 13,,subd. c).
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must prosecute the action to completion, and it imposes no penalty
upon him if he does nothing further, except that if an award has not
been made he cannot thereafter claim a deficiency. As the employee
commenced suit there was no assignment to the carrier, and as the
carrier would only be entitled to a lien if there were a recovery, he
has no grounds upon which he could make himself a party to the
action, and no legal right to compel the employee to prosecute. If
the tort feasor is a friend or relative of the employe6, the latter may
in effect discharge the tort feasor's liability to the carrier by bringing
suit and then faldng no further action. More dangerous still, is the
possibility of the employee entering into a secret settlement with the
third party. Or, assume that the employee brings suit within six
months of the date of an award, and then 'immediately discontinues
the action. The statute provides that the cause of action will be assigned to the carrier only if the employee fails to bring the action.
Here, as the employee "commenced" the action, the statute does not
provide for an assignment. Perhaps the courts will hold that "commence" means "commence, continue and prosecute to judgment", but
this interpretation would require more than a liberal amount of judicial legislation. If the legislature had meant "commence and prosecute in good faith", it would have been easy enough, to say so. Also,
it would have been just as easy to add a provision providing for an
assignment of the cause of action to the carrier in the event that the
employee discontinued suit.
(b)
Although the employee may not compromise his claim against
the third person without losing his right to a deficiency award if the
amount actually recovered is less than he would have received in
compensation, unless the carrier consents,3 8 there is no similar restriction upon the carrier. If the employee fails to bring suit within
six months, he loses control of the action to the extent that the carrier may make a settlement which would deprive the employee of a
share in an excess which might be warranted by the injury. True,
the employee can protect himself from this consequence by bringing
suit within the time limited, but it requires no great amount of imagination to conceive of many cases in which the employee would lack
the means to employ counsel to commence the action. If he is fortunate enough to be in a position to sue he is protected from inequitable conduct on the part of the carrier, and in addition, he is
entitled to the entire excess. If he cannot sue, he is more or less at
the mercy of the carrier, and besides, may share in any excess recovered only to the extent of two-thirds.
38

Roth v. Harlem Funeral Car Co., 268 N. Y. 661, 198 N. E. 545 (1935).
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(c)
Assume the employee has no intention of suing the third party,
must the carrier wait six months? Causes of action in tort for personal injuries are not assignable except where their assignment is
expressly allowed by statute,3 9 and in this case there is no provision
for assignment prior to six months from the date of the award. An
employee might be unwilling to bring an action himself, but might
have. no objection to allowing the carrier to do so, and yet no consent he might give would serve to vest the claim in the carrier. The
tort feasor may be solvent today but bankrupt six months hence.
Each minute that suit is withheld may lessen the carrier's chances of
being indemnified. Delay in bringing an action can result in loss,
and in no case in a benefit that would not be just as available if suit
were brought earlier. This provision, as it now stands, operates for
the benefit of the wrongdoer without giving either the carrier or the
employee any advantage.
Conclusion
Workmen's Compensation Laws are no longer social experiments. They are as essential to industry as they are to labor. They
are an integral part of one of the most important branches of our
law, for upon their effectiveness depends the potential welfare of
millions of employees and their families. The needs which they fill
are so closely related to the interests of society that no one can
gainsay that anything short of perfection is inadequate. Perhaps
unique situations and exceptional cases cannot be fully provided for,
but much confusion could be avoided if the section were amended to
provide for a joint cause of action in which either the employee or
the insurance carrier could make the other a party to the action.
Were this done there would be no question of prejudicial inactivity
by the employee, or an unfair compromise by the employer. Under
such a provision it would not be necessary for the insurance carrier
to wait six months if the employee refused to sue. A change of this
character, of course, would be merely procedural and would not
39 Richards v. National Transp. Co., 158 Misc. 324, 326, 285 N. Y. Supp.
870, 873 (1936) ("Section 41 of the Personal Property Law expressly prohibits
the assignment of a cause of action for personal injuries.
"The issue of public policy causes the court no concern. Repeated holdings
set the
judicial mind at rest on this point.
"Section
41 of the Personal Property Law is a relic-like remnant of the

laws of a social system that one is happy is long dead and buried. In the past
champerty and maintenance was a dreaded danger. In the present condition of
society we need not fear the same perversion of justice. Consequently our statutes are all that remain of the outworn maintenance and champerty"). Lang
v. Brooklyn City Railroad Co., 217 App. Div. 501, 217 N. Y. Supp. 277 (1st
Dept. 1926).
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necessarily involve a different substantive rule as to the recovery in
excess of the award plus the expenses of suit. That is, such a change
might give the entire surplus to the employee if he initiated the action, but only two-thirds of it if the carrier took the initiative. However, the writer cannot see that there would be any justification for
the perpetuation of this arbitrary rule.
Even though the legislature does not deem it advisable to alter
the procedure it certainly should amend the section so as to give
the net surplus to the employee. There is no apparent reason why
the insurance carrier should receive one-third of the net surplus as
a bonus for having brought the action. The entire judgment against
the third party tort feasor represents the actual loss of the employee.
His injury, his pain, his suffering are represented by that judgment.
It should be his, and the legislature can deprive him of the entire
surplus with no more justice, than it could give a surety in an ordinary case a greater sum than is necessary to indemnify him.
ANDREw
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